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COMPETITION POLICY AND GOVERNMENT 
INTERVENTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
AN EXAMINATION OF JAPANESE 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
HIROSHI IYORI* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The December 1998 Report of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy 
points out that trade policy and competition policy (primarily privatization, 
deregulation, and antitrust) interact to promote free competition, economic 
efficiency, and economic development in developing countries.1 The Report 
concludes that governments should not intervene to restrain competition, 
even if competition may damage certain industries.2 On the other hand, the 
1994 World Bank Report on East Asia reaches the opposite conclusion.3 This 
report analyzes the cases and processes of East Asia’s rapid development 
since 1980 (commonly called the “East Asia Miracle”) and concludes that 
positive measures enacted by East Asian governments greatly influenced 
regional economic development.4 
These two views do not necessarily conflict, and may exist in concert. 
This Article will discuss these two perspectives by first introducing the 
Japanese experiences in government intervention and competition policy, 
and then recommending what the competition policy should be in the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) community. This analysis will divide 
government control into two aspects: intervention for forming and 
 * Attorney-at-Law, Asahi Law Offices, Tokyo, Japan. Former Commissioner of the Japan Fair 
Trade Commission. 
 1. See World Trade Organization, Report (1999) of the Working Group on the Interaction 
Between Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council, WTO Doc. WT/WGTCP/3 (Oct. 11, 
1999), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_browse.asp. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT 88-89 (1994), available at 
http://www-wds.worldbank.org. See also World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and 
Public Policy, WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH REPORT (1993), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org (discussing the relationship between public policy and rapid economic growth in 
East Asia). 
 4. Id. Cf. Masahiko Aoki et al., Beyond The East Asian Miracle: Introducing the Market-
Enhancing View, in THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1-37 
(Masahiko Aoki et al. eds., 1997) (examining the role of government policy in facilitating or 
complementing private sector coordination). 
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maintaining free markets and competition (“A-type” intervention) and 
intervention for controlling free markets and competition (“B-type” 
intervention). 
II. THE GOVERNMENT’S ROLE AND COMPETITION POLICY IN JAPANESE 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
A. Pre-World War II 
1. Government Control and Competition in the Meiji Era 
The Tokugawa Shogunate had adopted an isolationist policy since the 
seventeenth century, and it was shocked to witness the United Kingdom 
defeat China in the Opium War (1839-42), as well as the subsequent invasion 
of China by Western countries. The Opium War demonstrated the superior 
military power backed by Western countries’ post-Industrial Revolution 
economic development. In 1853, the United States demanded the opening of 
Japanese markets. After intense discussions, the Tokugawa Shogunate 
executed the Japan-U.S. Friendship and Commerce Treaty, and thereafter 
executed similar treaties with Holland, Russia, Britain, and France. The 
Satsuma and Tyousyuu Domains, which had opposed the Shogunate’s open-
door policy strongly, formed the government after the Meiji Restoration in 
1868, and thereafter changed the policy to open Japan up to the world. 
The new government remodeled various institutions after Western models 
to catch up with the Western countries. By 1872, the government had 
abrogated feudal domains and barriers, liberalized land trade, abolished 
regulatory trade associations and the status system, established 
communication and transportation systems, and introduced free choice of 
professions. By 1882, the government had established an educational system, 
company system, currency system, central bank, financial system, securities 
exchange, and legal system. The government enforced these changes, but 
most of the changes represented formations of infrastructures for a free 
economic system, generally regarded as “A-type” intervention.5 After Japan 
opened itself up to liberal Western ideas and classical Western economics, 
economic liberalism predominated in Japan until the end of World War I. 
 5. Cf. Yoshio Kanazawa, The Regulation of Corporate Enterprise: The Law of Unfair 
Competition and the Control of Monopoly Power, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A 
CHANGING SOCIETY 482 (Arther T. von Mehren ed., 1963) (stating that the privatization of most 
government enterprises ultimately led to zaibatsu cartelization) [hereinafter LAW IN JAPAN]. 
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2. Free Competition from Foreign Countries 
The aforementioned commerce treaties barred Japanese restrictions on 
trade imports and reduced all Japanese custom duties to 5% or less. These 
restrictions remained effective until 1911. During this period, Japanese 
industries encountered intense competition from Western countries. As a 
result of defeat at the hands of foreign competition, the Japanese government 
sold many of its wholly owned factories to private companies by 1890, 
including its iron, steel, shipbuilding, and spinning plants. Economic 
liberalism, influenced by British economic theories, dominated this era. 
However, notwithstanding the trend toward privatization, the government 
still maintained telephone and telegraph services, postal service, basic 
railroads, and military industries. It was during this period that major 
enterprise groups called zaibatsu began developing.6 
3. Government Intervention Between the World Wars 
During the post-World War I depression, the Japanese government 
introduced anticompetition measures, which it accelerated following the 
1929 depression. Many argued that the scarcity of land and resources, the 
extreme size and poverty level of the population, and excessive competition 
justified economic control to restrict the excessive competition and 
nationalization of industries. The government enacted numerous “B-type” 
economic control laws, including the Major Industries Control Law of 1931 
(which promoted cartelization in major industries) and various business 
control laws that restricted new entry and prices. These policies soon 
developed into the wartime economic control system. In 1940, the 
government reformed the administrative structure of economic control to 
control commodities under the order of the War Mobilization Act of 1938.7 
This structure continued well after World War II ended.8 
 6. The term zaibatsu refers to the great family-controlled banking and industrial combines of 
modern Japan. For background information on zaibatsu, see HIDEMASA MORIKAWA, ZAIBATSU: THE 
RISE AND FALL OF FAMILY ENTERPRISE GROUPS IN JAPAN (1992). 
 7. See YUKIO NOGUCHI, 1940 NEN TAISEI [1940 SYSTEM] (1955). 
 8. Id. 
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B. Post-World War II 
1. The Economic Democratization Policy: Introduction of a Free 
Market System 
In 1945, the General Headquarters of the Allied Powers (GHQ) 
introduced economic, social, and political democratization policies into 
Japan. The GHQ planned to democratize the centralized Japanese economic 
system and eliminate its militaristic character. These policies promoted 
farmland reform, labor system reform, zaibatsu dissolution, the elimination 
of excessive economic concentration, the abolition of various economic 
control laws and associations, and the enactment of the Act Concerning 
Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade 
(“Antimonopoly Law”). The GHQ intended these changes to result in the 
formation of a free competitive market economy. 
2. The Idea of the Economic Democratization of Postwar Japan in the 
United States 
In 1943, Robert Fearey, a U.S. State Department official, first introduced 
the idea of economic democratization at a meeting to discuss postwar 
occupation policy for Japan. By that time, the U.S. Government already had 
decided to confine Japan to its pre-Sino-Japanese War borders. However, the 
issue of Japanese economic reorganization remained. Fearey recognized that: 
(1) Japan contained a large number of poor people and only a handful of rich 
people due to the feudalistic tenant farming system, restricted labor unions, 
and zaibatsu control over major industries; (2) Japan contained very few 
middle class citizens, which was in contrast to modern Western countries 
where the middle class dominated; (3) the Japanese national market was very 
small and restricted; (4) Japan invaded foreign countries in pursuit of new 
markets and resources; and (5) it was necessary to democratize the Japanese 
economic system in order to expand the national market and bring about the 
healthy development of Japan.9 The report of Corwin D. Edwards’ zaibatsu 
research mission in 1946 substantially confirmed Fearey’s idea.10 
 9. See Robert Fearey, Japanese Post-war Economic Considerations, U.S. State Dept. Doc. No. E 
155 T. 354 (July 21, 1943). Cf. Marlene J. Mayo, American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan: 
The Role of the Experts, in AMERICANS AS PROCONSULS: UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN 
GERMANY AND JAPAN, 1944-1952 3 (Robert Wolfe ed., 1984) (discussing how the U.S. government 
designed postwar planning for the occupation and reform of Japan to advance the security and interests 
of the United States as a global power). 
 10. An outline of the report of the Edwards Mission was made public on Oct. 10, 1946, and a 
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3. Enactment of the Antimonopoly Law 
The GHQ requested that the Japanese government enact an antimonopoly 
law in November 1945 to form a basic economic order from a permanent 
part of Japan’s economic democratization, apart from the temporary 
measures like zaibatsu dissolution and the abolition of economic control laws 
and associations. Initially, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry prepared a 
draft of an antimonopoly bill in early 1946. This draft permitted the existence 
of cartels, but regulated their abusive conduct because Japan’s few resources 
and large population made trusting free competition dangerous. The GHQ 
rejected this draft and proposed a model draft bill known as the Kime draft.11 
Shortly thereafter, the Economic Stabilization Agency modeled a new 
draft after U.S. antitrust laws. The agency set up a drafting committee in the 
fall of 1946, chaired by Ryogo Hashimoto, the father of future Prime 
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto. This committee understood the policies 
embedded in U.S. antitrust law and thought that the future Japanese economy 
should exist as a free market economy and participate in free international 
trade.12 The final draft, which closely resembled U.S. antitrust statutes, was 
enacted in April 1947 as the Antimonopoly Law. The Antimonopoly Law 
describes its purpose in Section 1: 
This Act, by prohibiting private monopolization, unreasonable 
restraint of trade and unfair trade practices, by preventing the 
excessive concentration of economic power and by eliminating 
unreasonable restraints of production, sale, price, technology and the 
like, and all other unjust restriction of business activities through 
combinations, agreements and otherwise, aims to promote free and 
fair competition, to stimulate the creative initiative of entrepreneurs, to 
summary of it is contained in JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMM’N, THE ANTIMONOPOLY POLICY: 20 YEARS, 
at 7, reprinted in Sheet No. ESS (A)-02447-48 (National Diet Library, 1982). 
 11. See 1 FAIR TRADE COMM’N, 50 YEARS OF THE ANTIMONOPOLY POLICY 25, 678; Harry First, 
Antitrust in Japan: The Original Intent, 9 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 1, 35-40 (2000). 
 12. Ryogo Hashimoto wrote: 
The fundamental idea of the [Antimonopoly] Act could be said that it was founded basically on 
the economic ideal of liberalistic capitalism, which is a most orthodox idea . . . Of course, our 
nation instituted market control policies and measures in prewar times, and there might be various 
measures to cope with issues such as scarce economic wealth, fear of capital exhaustion, 
underdeveloped private investment, mass production of inferior goods, or collapses due to 
excessive competition, depletion of resources, etc. However, I will hope for a fresh, vigorous 
future of our nation, always competing with actively and decisively and standing side by side with 
business to produce superior goods and services, to take care of such issues.  
Ryogo Hashimoto, Dokusen Kinshi-ho to Wagakuni Keizai [Antimonopoly Law and the Japanese 
Economy], NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN, 1947, at 4-6. 
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encourage business activities of enterprises, to heighten the level of 
employment and people’s real income, and thereby to promote the 
democratic and wholesome development of the national economy as 
well as to assure the interests of consumers in general.13 
The government enacted the Antimonopoly Law as the cornerstone for 
the economic order of the new era. The GHQ did not mandate enactment of 
the Antimonopoly Law; the Japanese government enacted it autonomously 
along with the farmland and labor union system reforms. 
4. Early Enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law  
The government organized the Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) 
in July 1947 to enforce the Antimonopoly Law. Kikumatsu Nakayama, the 
first chairman of the JFTC (1947-1952), explained the aims of the 
Antimonopoly Law as follows:  
“Economic democratization” means an economic situation where 
faithful and fair people are respected and honored, and where their 
abilities can be freely, highly and fully developed, so that people are 
able to have the chance to enjoy a happy social life. Formally, it is a 
situation where the denial of munitions industries, dissolution of 
zaibatsu, popularization of capital, cooperation and participation in the 
management of workers, reforms of farmland, etc., are realized, and 
the fundamental idea is the establishment, maintenance and 
development of a humane economy based on egalitarianism, freedom 
and fraternity. Frankly speaking, it is an economic situation where 
there is a universally diffused and growing real income without an 
unequal distribution or binding of capital, which is “a humane 
economy, a free and creative economy for human beings by human 
beings” . . . 
 The purpose of a national economy linked to the world economy is 
not only to protect the lives of a nation’s people but is also a situation 
where the people of the world can enjoy the results. An economy 
which contains the causes for an imperialistic economic invasion 
should not be called a wholesome national economy. A wholesome 
national economy is a “peaceful economy,” from which the relief and 
 13. Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade, Act No. 54 
of 1947, § 1 [hereinafter Antimonopoly Law], reprinted in HIROSHI IYORI & AKINORI UESUGI, THE 
ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS AND POLICIES OF JAPAN app. A, at 387 (1994). 
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development of humane lives of the people of the world as well as a 
nation can be produced, and where there is no more struggle and 
exploitation . . . 
 Summarizing the above, “the democratic and wholesome 
development of the national economy” means the maintenance and 
development of an economic situation in which the opportunity of 
developing the faithful and true power of a human being in 
correspondence with his/her talents can be equally recognized, and 
thereby bring about the relief of human lives.14 
This was an excellent expression of the Japanese free market economy 
combined with popular Confucian philosophy.15 Nakayama firmly believed 
that the Antimonopoly Law was necessary for the new Japanese economic 
order. The JFTC’s second chairman, Masatoshi Yokota (1952-1957; future 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Japan), held deep respect for 
Nakayama and shared similar beliefs in the importance of the Antimonopoly 
Law.16 The ideas behind the enforcement policies of the early JFTC flow 
directly from their combined experience and wisdom.17 
C. The Development of Industrial Policy 
1. The Postwar Government Economic Intervention  
Difficult economic conditions persisted after World War II, spurring the 
adoption of temporary “B-type” government interventions until 1950. In 
addition, Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act of 1946, the U.S. 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation selectively allotted financial resources 
to essential industries to prompt rapid postwar recovery.18 The 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation ceased activity in 1951, but the 
 14. 1 UMIKUCHI SHOTEN, KEIZAIMINSHUKA [THE ECONOMIC DEMOCRATIZATION] 16 (1948) 
(emphasis added). 
 15. Confucian philosophy was influential in Japan at least until 1960. It respected practical 
righteousness, thoughtfulness, and fidelity. See KIN NIKKON, HIGASIAJIA NO KEIZAIHATTEN TO JUKYO 
BUNKA [ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF EAST ASIA AND CONFUCIAN CULTURE] (1992) (exploring the 
relationship between Confucian culture and the economic development of East Asia). 
 16. See MASATOSHI YOKOTA, HO NO KOKORO [SPIRIT OF THE LAW] 96 (1971). 
 17. See, e.g., Kohji Tanabe, The Process of Litigation: An Experiment with the Adversary 
System, in LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 5, at 73. 
 18. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was similar to a U.S. agency created in 1932 under 
the Hoover administration to facilitate economic activity by lending money during the Great 
Depression. For more information, see Ronald C. Moe, The Reconstruction Finance Corporation: A 
Brief History (Cong. Research Serv., 1979), at http://www.napawash.org (describing the history of the 
Corporation and focusing on its creation and transformation throughout the 1940s and 1950s). 
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government subsequently established the Japan Development Bank in 1952. 
The government controlled the importation of goods with the Foreign 
Exchange Control Act of 1949, and regulated the importation of technologies 
with the Foreign Investment Act of 1950. This control continued through the 
liberalization of trade in 1960 and the liberalization of capital in 1968.  
2. The Development of Industrial Policy 
Apart from these temporary control measures, an industrial policy of “B-
type” government intervention developed after the 1951 San Francisco Peace 
Treaty between the Allied Powers and Japan. Industrial administrative 
agencies, whose staff had been trained under the wartime control system, 
could not understand the new free market system.19 They still focused on 
resource scarcity and population density, and believed that both free 
competition (such as in the United States) was inappropriate for Japan and 
the government should restrict excessive competition. In addition, the 
dominant economists at that time were Marxians and scholars who 
recommended a planned economy to the administrative agencies. These “B-
type” industrial policies aimed to promote exports, relieve depressed 
industries, protect small and medium-size enterprises, and rationalize and 
promote industries. Ever since, Japanese antimonopoly policy has coexisted 
with confrontation and compromise. 
As part of the execution of industrial policies, (1) the government created 
financial institutions like the Japan Development Bank and the Export and 
Import Bank and financed them according to the industrial policies, (2) the 
Economic Planning Agency designed a five-year economic plan, and (3) 
each industrial agency began performing according to the industrial policies 
and creating special privileged semi-governmental corporations (tokushu 
hojin) in various fields. 
3. The Enactment of Various Exemption Laws 
Beginning in 1951, MITI intervened in industries by specially allocating 
financial resources, providing special tax reductions, granting exemptions for 
cartelization through the enactment of special laws, and issuing informal 
administrative recommendations (kankoku sohtan) for the stabilization, 
 
 19. For example, Mr. Yoshihiko Morozumi, who participated in drafting the Antimonopoly Law 
and later became the vice president of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), stated 
that being trained under the prewar economic system made it difficult to understand the basic ideas of 
the antimonopoly policy. See Yoshihiko Morozumi, Watashi no Rirekisho [My Personal History], 
NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN, Mar. 13, 1996, at 13. 
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rationalization, or promotion of specific industries.20 A bureaucracy kept 
from the wartime mobilization system of 1940 performed these interventions. 
The tight relationship between government, industry, and politicians under a 
strong conservative government accelerated these interventions after the 
1955 coalition. 
The government originally enacted these exemption laws as temporary 
measures, but decided to lengthen their life significantly. For example, the 
government extended the The Act on Temporary Measures for the Promotion 
of the Machinery Industry (Kikai Kogyo Shinko Rinji Sochi-ho) of 1961, 
which authorized the existence of rationalization cartels through several 
amendments, until 1985 when strong criticism by the United States prompted 
its abolition. 
4. The Relaxation of the Antimonopoly Law in 1953 
After the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, industrial circles such as 
the Keidanren, and industrial administrative agencies such as MITI, 
requested the relaxation of the Antimonopoly Law. These groups insisted on 
a basic free formation of cartels. In 1953, the government amended the 
Antimonopoly Law to authorize both depression cartels and rationalization 
cartels. Even after this amendment, MITI enacted the aforementioned special 
exemption laws and carried out many recommendations to curtail production. 
In 1958, the Diet debated a draft bill to relax the Antimonopoly Law further. 
Although many major industries and MITI supported this bill, it met strong 
opposition from consumers, farmers, small enterprise groups and journalists, 
and consequently never became law. 
5. Modification of Japan’s Industrial Policy 
In 1960, the Japanese government began to employ a price stabilization 
policy, consumer policy, small business policy, and trade liberalization 
policy, which greatly influenced the development of Japanese antimonopoly 
policy as a whole. Young scholars, influenced by their economics studies in 
the United States, positively supported the new direction in which Japan’s 
antimonopoly policy seemed to be heading. MITI’s Industrial Structure 
Research Committee stated in its 1963 report that the Japanese economy, in 
principle, allowed for the free activities of enterprises, and that it was 
necessary to utilize competitive functions to stimulate the creativity of 
 20. See Yutaka Kosai, The Reconstruction Period, in INDUSTRIAL POLICY OF JAPAN 25 (Ryutaro 
Komiya et al. eds., Kazuo Sato trans., 1988). 
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enterprises and promote economic efficiency. This reason alone, MITI 
indicated, made the Antimonopoly Law extremely important. Popular 
opinion perceived this as a change in industrial policy, and the Cabinet 
stopped issuing anticompetitive administrative recommendations in 1964, but 
MITI was pushing the modified industrial policy to maintain and assist the 
formation of oligopolistic industries.21 
6. The Relationship Between Japanese Antimonopoly Policy and 
Industrial Policy 
Scholars differ in their evaluations of the effects of the antimonopoly 
policy and industrial policy on economic developments after World War II. 
In early times, many appreciated the industrial policy; however, most 
attribute Japan’s recent economic development to vigorous competition 
among enterprises under the economic democratization policy and the 
competition policy enforced through the Antimonopoly Law.22 
D. Development of Competition Policy after the 1970s 
1. The Strengthening of the Antimonopoly Law 
By 1970, Japan’s gross national product rivaled that of developed 
Western countries, and although market intervention and the activities of 
enterprises carried out through industrial policies should have ended, they 
continued through two oil crises and numerous trade disputes. The Japanese 
government used the 1977 amendment to strengthen the Antimonopoly Law 
to oppose abusive conduct by big businesses and introduce the surcharge 
system against price cartels, over the objections of industrial circles and 
MITI. 
2. Promotion of Competition Policy and the Decline of Industrial 
Policy 
In the early 1980s, in response to the altered economic climate, the 
Japanese government partially implemented new privatization and 
 21. The Tokyo High Court’s Decision in the Oil Cartel Criminal Cases of 1980 exposed the 
relationship between administrative guidance and oil cartels in the 1970s. See J. Mark Ramseyer, The 
Oil Cartel Criminal Cases: Translations and Postscript, 15 L. JAPAN 57, 57-66 (1982). The 
Temporary Act for Specific Industries Promotion (Tokutei sangyo shinko rinji sochi ho), drafted and 
proposed by MITI in an attempt to form oligopolistic markets, never was enacted. 
 22. See infra Part II.E.1. 
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deregulation policies. The government privatized the Japan Telegraph and 
Telephone Public Corporation, Japan National Railway Corporation, and 
Japan Tobacco Corporation in 1985, but delayed other deregulation, which 
caused the Japanese economy to stagnate in 1990. The coalition between the 
government, industries, and politicians through industrial policies was one of 
the principal causes of this delay. 
Foreign governments have criticized the Japanese industrial and closed 
market policies strongly. For example, the United States, in the Structural 
Impediments Initiative negotiations with Japan from 1989 to 1990, strongly 
requested that Japan adopt a deregulation and competition promotion policy 
to open the Japanese market to foreign countries. 
Throughout the 1990s, Japanese economic policy essentially revolved 
around deregulation and competition promotion, primarily to structurally 
improve the Japanese economy in the new era of globalization. The 
government revised the Antimonopoly Law several times during this period 
to strengthen its regulations and toughened enforcement, which now includes 
criminal prosecution. In the process, the government abolished many 
exemption laws. MITI did not oppose such changes, but instead supported 
them and ceased pursuing an anticompetitive industrial policy. In addition, 
the government also developed and instituted reforms for administrative 
agencies, financial institutions, and privileged corporations. 
E. Antimonopoly Policy, Economic Development, and Technological 
Innovation 
1. Antimonopoly Policy and Economic Development 
Until 1965, industrial circles and economic administrations criticized 
antimonopoly policy because it promoted excessive competition, disturbed 
the activities of enterprises, and hindered economic development. However, 
many now attribute Japan’s rapid postwar economic development to the 
competition policy under the economic democratization policy rather than to 
the anticompetitive industrial policy.23 
Due to the dynamic competition promoted under the Antimonopoly Law, 
new entrants such as Sony and Honda were able to develop freely, which in 
turn spurred rapid innovation in many other fields. 
 23. Cf. TAKAHIDE NAKAMURA, LECTURES ON MODERN JAPANESE ECONOMIC HISTORY 1926-
1994 145-54 (1994) (discussing the positive impact of economic democratization on Japan); ELEANOR 
HADLEY, ANTITRUST IN JAPAN 439-53 (1970) (assessing the success of U.S. economic 
democratization on the Japanese economy). 
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2. Antimonopoly Policy and Technological Innovation 
Strong innovation, promoted by the antimonopoly policy, influenced 
Japan’s rapid postwar economic development, thereby promoting 
competition. After the war, a gap between Japan and the United States and 
other Western countries emerged, which forced Japanese enterprises to 
compete with imported foreign technologies. The foreign technologies were 
imported under unfavorable contract terms, which are prohibited by Section 
6(1) of the Antimonopoly Law.24 In 1968, when capital liberalization began, 
the JFTC issued the Antimonopoly Act Guidelines for International 
Licensing Agreements. The guidelines eliminated grant-back clauses 
(referring to the assignment of a licensee’s right of technological 
improvement) in contracts, which obliged a licensee to give technology 
improved by the licensee to the licensor.25 The elimination of grant-back 
clauses gave Japanese enterprises incentives to develop technological 
improvements, and it ultimately contributed to technological improvements 
by the licensors as well. The policy of eliminating grant-back clauses spread 
to developing countries through the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) and likely contributed to developing members’ 
economic growth.26 
3. Evaluation of Industrial Policy 
Recently, many have criticized industrial policy, which is a “B-type” 
intervention of the free market. However, it is necessary and rational during a 
 24. Section 6(1) of the Antimonopoly Law states that “[n]o entrepreneur shall enter into an 
international agreement or an international contract which contains such matters as constitute [an] 
unreasonable restraint of trade or unfair trade practices.” Antimonopoly Law § 6(1). 
 25. The guidelines examined nine types of tying clauses. Section I(7) of the guidelines stated that 
one unfair business practice, in international licensing agreements was  
to make it obligatory for the licensee to inform the licensor of knowledge or experience newly 
obtained regarding the licensed technology, or to assign the right with respect to an improved or 
applied invention by the licensee to the licensor or grant the licensor a license thereon. However, 
such cases are excluded where the licensor bears similar obligations and the obligations of both 
parties are equally balanced in substance. 
Japan Fair Trade Comm’n, Antimonopoly Act Guidelines for International Licensing Agreements 
§ I(7) (May 24, 1968), reprinted in ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION OF JAPAN (Masanao Nakagawa ed., 
1984). The FTC corrected the 1892 grant-back clauses in the 15 years from 1970 to 1984. 2 FAIR 
TRADE COMMISSION, 50 YEARS OF THE ANTIMONOPOLY POLICY 466. 
 26. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Control of Restrictive Practices 
in Transfer of Technology Transactions, U.N. Doc. TD/AC 1/17 (1978) (explaining the effectiveness 
of anti-grant-back policies); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Draft 
International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/47 (1985), 
available at http://www.unctad.org/stdev/compendium/documents/TD.CODE.doc. 
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time of scarcity to allocate resources to maximize economic development, 
provide information or advice to enterprises, adjust friction between 
industries, and eliminate the anxiety of enterprises. Nonetheless, industrial 
policy should only be used in exceptional circumstances, and then only as a 
temporary measure. Furthermore, the developing country should conclude 
use of the policy as soon as it catches up to advanced Western countries. 
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR COMPETITION POLICY IN APEC 
A. Free Trade and Competition Policy 
After World War II, the free trade established under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and WTO stimulated massive 
economic development in many countries. Japan attained its economic 
development from as far back as the Meiji era by following a free trade 
policy. Regional free trade areas and bilateral free trade agreements are 
necessary to promote free trade and will not hamper the free trade of the 
world economy as long as each observes the conditions articulated in the 
preamble to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.27 
However, in addition to international free trade policy, countries must adopt 
a national competition policy, consisting of privatization, deregulation, and 
antimonopoly laws.  
B. Government Intervention and Economic Development 
A positive and well-planned “A-type” government intervention in 
elements of the infrastructure like education, legislation, transportation, and 
telegraph and telephone systems does not necessarily disturb a free market. 
Such intervention actually helps form a free market system by preparing the 
system’s infrastructure. In Japan, the Meiji government created various 
infrastractures by conducting positive intervention. The government 
intervention for the postwar economic democratization was a similar “A-
type” intervention.28 Cases may exist where it is necessary for a government 
to provide information, guidance, protection, or regulations for immature 
enterprises and industries through “B-type” interventions to attain rapid 
development. However, these “B-type” interventions must be minimal, 
temporary, and exceptional, and a policy of free competition must 
 27. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994). 
 28. See supra Part II.C.1. 
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predominate, for the prolonged “B-type” anticompetitive interventions of the 
past may be principally responsible for the long and difficult economic 
stagnation Japan has endured since 1990. 
C. Prohibition and Exemption of Antimonopoly Laws 
Antimonopoly laws should confirm the aims of promoting competition, 
prohibit price cartels and similar agreements, and create an independent 
enforcement agency. Countries could allow necessary exemptions under 
certain conditions such as those stated in Article 81(3) of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community.29 Even in the United States, the 
judicially created rule of reason doctrine serves as the fundamental principle 
of U.S. antitrust laws. 
D. Free Competition and Fair Conduct 
The national government must control the monopolizing and abusive 
conduct of market dominating enterprises as well as other unfair business 
practices. A tendency exists at present, under the influence of the Chicago 
School of Economics, to have antitrust laws aim exclusively to promote 
economic efficiency. However, legislators enacted most antitrust laws, 
including those in the United States, to prevent the abusive practices of big 
businesses.  
Circumstances may require East Asian countries under Confucian 
influences to state unequivocally that antitrust law aims to protect free 
competition and the fair conduct of corporations simultaneously. Varied 
national, social, and cultural traditions influence what people consider fair, 
and for people in East Asia, fairness remains one of the most important 
values in their social lives. 
Because many countries—each with its own history and culture—form 
APEC, antimonopoly laws may embody different tones. However, if APEC 
understands that the primary purpose of all antimonopoly laws is to promote 
free competition, harmonizing those different laws may not be so difficult. 
 29. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997). 
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